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Abstract
This chapter infers the distribution of AIDS costs in India,
Indonesia, and Thailand from data on the costs of detecting and
treating AIDS and from information on the nature of different
countries' health care finance systems and related
institutions. The main finding is that the AIDS epidemic will
contribute to increased economic inequality in these countries
because (a) it is disproportionately affecting low-income
groups and (b) public and private institutions that could
spread the costs of the epidemic (for example, health, life,
disability, and social welfare insurance) are relatively
limited and do not reach the majority of the populations. The
chapter also develops a new approach to measuring AIDS medical
care costs that yields estimates of US$738 per case in India
and US$1490 per case in Indonesia. Finally, the chapter
discusses the political economy of HIV prevention and
speculates that more effective control of the epidemic may
result from a system in which the government pays for the
medical care costs of AIDS than one in which individuals with
AIDS and their families bear most of the costs.
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Who Is Bearing the Cost of the AIDS Epidemic in Asia?
During the past two decades, the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
that causes acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) has been introduced
into the populations of many countries in both the developed and the
developing world. Because of the long lag (an average of eight to ten
years) between the time of HIV infection and the onset of AIDS symptoms,
most individuals who carry the HIV are unaware that they are infected and,
more important, that they may be infecting others through unprotected sex,
blood donations, reused needles, and so on. Perhaps the most dangerous
feature of the HIV is that it can spread silently through a population for
many years before it overtly signals its presence.
Because HIV disproportionately infects individuals in their prime
working years (see, for example, Over and Piot, forthcoming), who
typically die within two years of the onset of AIDS symptoms (sooner in
developing countries), and because the disease is relatively expensive to
treat, the epidemic may have important economic impacts. An expanding
literature within the field of economics has sought to quantify the
epidemic's actual and potential costs. By applying standard methods for
measuring the costs of illness, economists have established that the per
case costs of AIDS are high relative to those of other serious illnesses.
(For example, see Bloom and Carliner 1988 for the U.S., Eastwood and
Maynard 1988 for the United Kingdom, Hassig and others 1990 for a study on
Zaire, and Chela, Campbell, and Siankanga 1989 for Zambia). This finding
implies that the aggregate cost of the epidemic will also be high if many
people are infected.
Beyond the aggregate cost of AIDS, the distribution of those costs is
of considerable significance. Those who potentially bear the cost of AIDS
are: (a) individuals who develop AIDS and their families and friends, (b)
employers of individuals with AIDS, (c) health and life insurance
companies, (d) health care providers, (e) users of the health care system
that do not have AIDS, (f) taxpayers, and (g) international agencies and
charitable organizations. Despite economists' interest in measuring the
costs of AIDS, they have devoted little attention to the distribution of
those costs. In addition to helping define the structure of incentives
that can affect the future course and costs of the epidemic, the
distribution of costs may have important implications for economic
inequality.
The main objective of this chapter is to examine the distribution of
AIDS costs in selected Asian countries. As no data are available that
directly measure who pays those costs, their distribution is inferred by
applying standard economic reasoning to basic information on the costs of
detecting and treating AIDS, and on the nature of different countries'
health care systems and related institutions. The countries studied are
India, Indonesia, and Thailand, which differ considerably from each other
in the nature and financing of their health care institutions, income
levels, patterns of HIV transmission, and current and projected incidence
of the HIV and AIDS (see table 1).
Our main finding is that the AIDS epidemic is contributing to
increased economic inequality in these countries because (a) it is
disproportionately affecting low-income groups, and (b) public and private
institutions that could spread the costs of the epidemic (for example,
health, life, disability, and social welfare insurance) are relatively
limited and do not reach the majority of the population. We also discuss
the political economy of HIV prevention and question the applicability of
the view that concentrating AIDS costs upon individuals that have AIDS
will promote control of the epidemic.
The Cost of AIDS
AIDS costs can be separated into direct and indirect components.
Direct costs refer to the value of scarce resources that must be diverted
to prevent, diagnose, and treat AIDS. As measuring expenditures on
prevention is extremely difficult, the discussion that follows will use
the term direct medical care costs to refer solely to the costs of
diagnosis and treatment. Indirect costs refer to the value of income
foregone because of AIDS-related morbidity and mortality. (For a
discussion of the computation of indirect costs in this context see Bloom
and Mahal 1992; Glied 1990.) Because they are so difficult to measure,
the psychological costs associated with illness-related morbidity and
mortality are not typically included in cost of illness studies.
Table 2 reports direct medical care cost estimates for India,
Indonesia, and Thailand. The direct medical care cost estimates for
Thailand and the lower bound estimate of direct medical care costs for
India come from independent studies. The estimates for India and
Indonesia are derived in this chapter.
The standard approach to estimating AIDS medical care costs involves
analyzing hospital data on costs or charges associated with treating AIDS
and its symptoms (see Bloom and Carliner 1988). This approach is,
however, prone to underestimation as individuals may receive treatment
from a number of medical facilities and personnel or may treat themselves.
This source of bias is an especially relevant concern in the countries
under study. Thus, we develop and apply an alternative method for
estimating the medical care costs of AIDS based on three sources of
information: (a) the distribution of AIDS symptoms expected in a
developing Asian population; (b) the number of medical examinations and
hospital days and the nature of the drug treatments typically prescribed
for various AIDS symptoms; and (c) the unit cost of medical examinations,
hospital days, drugs, and HIV tests in each country. Tables 3 and 4
provide details of the cost calculations.
The estimates of direct medical care costs are reasonably close—
between US$738 and US$1522—for the different countries, even though their
national per capita income varies by a factor of nearly four. This result
mainly reflects (a) the similar range of treatments in the different
countries, for example, none of these countries use AZT, DDI, or
aerosolized Pentamidine on a regular basis; and (b) the importance as a
component of cost of tests and drugs whose prices vary relatively little
across countries.
We estimate indirect costs by assuming that an individual infected
with the HIV foregoes earnings of GDP per adult from the age at which he
or she becomes symptomatic (assumed to be 35) to the average retirement
age in his or her country (assumed to be 60). GDP per adult may overstate
the true earnings loss given the evidence (cited and discussed below) that
the epidemic is disproportionately affecting low-income groups. But this
bias is presumably offset by the assumption of no future economic growth
and the assumption of no family earnings loss caused by other family
members foregoing work or school to care for the individual with AIDS. We
also assume a real discount rate of 3 percent. The resulting indirect
cost estimates (shown in table 2) are considerably larger than the direct
medical care costs and exhibit much greater variation across the
countries.
The third column in table 2 shows the sum of direct and indirect AIDS
cost estimates for each country. The resulting figures indicate that an
AIDS case costs about US$11,000 in India, US$16,000 in Indonesia, and
US$36,000 in Thailand. The fifth column multiplies the per case costs by
the number of cases currently projected through the year 2000 (reported in
table 1) to project the cumulative aggregate cost of AIDS by the year
2000. These estimates range from US$81 million for Indonesia to US$11
billion for India to US$18 billion for Thailand. The figures for India
and Thailand are sizable, representing 5 percent and 23 percent of their
respective 1990 GDP's. Note, however, that these projected cumulative
AIDS costs will occur in the future, and that they will be spread over
many years and have not been fully discounted.
The Distribution of AIDS Costs
The preceding section identified the components and magnitude of AIDS
costs in the three countries under study. The purpose of this section is
to examine the distribution of those costs among different payers.
The Distribution of Indirect Costs
Lost income is considerably larger than AIDS medical care costs. In
the three countries under study, individuals with AIDS and their families
tend to bear the burden of lost income, mainly because relatively few
people have disability or life insurance. For example, in 1987 fewer than
one in fifteen working-age Indians had any life insurance coverage
(Balachandran 1987). Even among those with life insurance, coverage
amounts are typically small in relation to annual earnings. Calculations
based on Indian data reported in Balachandran (1987) indicate that the
amount insured per policy averaged around US$1230 (assuming $1 = Rs 13),
only about five times per capita income in India and considerably less
than the average income loss due to AIDS. As relatively few people are
covered and insurance levels are relatively low among those covered, the
total amount of life insurance coverage is low in all three countries. In
Indonesia the amount insured under life insurance was 6 percent of the
national income in 1988, while in Thailand the corresponding figure was 16
percent. In contrast, the figure for Japan was 165 percent (American
Council of Life Insurance 1990). Rough calculations, based on data
reported in Balachandran (1987) and World Bank (1988) suggest that the
corresponding figure for India was 16 percent in 1987.
Coverage rates in all three countries are highest among government
employees, employees of large firms, and high-income groups, but these
individuals tend to be relatively well educated and at low risk for
contracting the HIV given current transmission patterns in these
countries. As social assistance benefits (for widows, orphans, and so on)
are also limited in these countries, public insurance does not effectively
spread the income losses associated with AIDS morbidity and mortality
beyond the immediate, or perhaps the extended, family of the individual
with AIDS.
Personal income losses because of AIDS morbidity and mortality do not
translate directly into income losses from the standpoint of society. For
example, in a pure labor surplus economy, (that is, one in which an
unlimited number of workers can be hired at the going wage), personal
income losses that result when individuals with AIDS are unable to work
are perfectly offset by personal income gains to other previously non-
employed individuals who take their jobs, with no net impact on national
income. Insofar as both India and Indonesia have many features of classic
labor surplus economies (at least in certain industrial and occupational
sectors), personal income losses probably overstate national income losses
associated with AIDS mortality.
At the other extreme, in a fixed labor supply economy, personal
income losses represent only one component of social losses, with an
additional component arising from the loss of profit accruing to firms
that hire less labor at a higher wage (provided the demand for labor is
not completely insensitive to the wage rate). In a competitive economy in
which labor is not the only factor of production, this loss of profit will
lead to higher output prices, forcing consumers to bear some of the
economic burden of AIDS. In this situation, which is likely to be
applicable to the case of Thailand as Thai labor markets are generally
tight (including the market for long-haul lorry drivers, as detailed in
the chapter by Giraud in this volume), AIDS mortality improves the
economic well-being of workers who do not have AIDS; diminishes the well-
being of consumers, who must pay higher prices for goods and services; and
generates social losses that exceed personal income losses. (Employment
increases will generally result from higher output prices, but they will
not outweigh the initial employment losses associated with AIDS mortality.
See Bloom and Mahal 1992.)
AIDS mortality could have further adverse implications for private
and social well-being if the epidemic attacks a critical resource that is
available in relatively fixed supply, such as educated labor. (See Lucas
1988 and Romer 1986 for general analyses of beneficial spillover effects
associated with an economy's accumulation of human capital.) In this
scenario, the epidemic could disrupt an economy beyond the level captured
by the output lost due to AIDS deaths by leading to output reductions in
other firms and sectors. However, because the epidemic in India,
Indonesia, and Thailand is not heavily concentrated among the skilled
workforce (as opposed to the situation in Africa), costs are not likely to
be appreciably magnified and spread through this mechanism.
For the impact of AIDS on the educated work force in Africa, see
Hassig and others (1990) and Hira and others (1990). For Asia, available
evidence suggests a relatively greater impact on the low-skilled, in
particular, commercial sex workers, migrant workers, and commercial blood
donors. For example, with respect to the case of India see Bailey (1991),
Bhattacharya (1992), McDonald (1992), Nataraj (1990), and National AIDS
Control Programme, India (1992), and with respect to the case of Thailand
see the chapter by Viravaidya, Obremskey, and Myers in this volume. See
also the chapter by Thant in this volume for a discussion of the incidence
pattern among ethnic groups and commercial sex workers in various Asian
countries. Although these studies generally suggest disproportionately
high rates of HIV infection among individuals with relatively low
socioeconomic status, the fact that none are based on nationally
representative samples is a notable qualification to some of our results.
Indeed, most of the reported cases of HIV infection and full-blown AIDS in
these countries are among middle and upper class individuals since they
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are more likely to see medical personnel and undergo HIV testing. On the
other hand, personal communications with epidemiologists in India,
Indonesia, and Thailand all highlight a growing connection between HIV
infection and low income, based on patterns of infection among commercial
sex workers who serve different income groups, patterns in the prevalence
of other sexually transmitted diseases (an important cofactor of HIV
infection) among commercial sex workers and their clients, and health
practices among different socioeconomic groups.
The Distribution of Medical Care Costs
Medical care costs are incurred when individuals are diagnosed and
treated for AIDS. Table 4 breaks down the components of these costs,
namely, HIV tests, physician consultations, drugs, and days spent in the
hospital.
Although diagnosis and treatment protocols vary across patients,
especially those in different income classes, and may include services not
considered in table 4 (for example, x-rays and the use of respirators for
tuberculosis cases), the typical protocol for treating AIDS in all three
countries involves prescribing drugs to alleviate the common symptoms of
the disease (see table 3). Relatively expensive drugs such as AZT, DDI,
and aerosolized Pentamidine, which are used widely to treat AIDS in
wealthy industrialized countries, have thus far been used only rarely in
the developing countries of Asia. (However, Handley (1992) reports the
possibility of clinical trials for various new AIDS drugs in Thailand in
the near future and India is reported to be well on its way to
manufacturing AZT domestically.)
While treatment protocols are similar, the institutions that provide
these treatments differ greatly across the three countries. These
differences are likely to have a significant impact on the distribution of
medical care costs among different payers. The appendix describes the
health care systems of India, Indonesia, and Thailand. There are three
key points to note with respect to this information. First, each country
operates both a public and a private health care system. High income
groups and urban populations tend to rely on the private health care
system (see Griffin 1990), which is the larger of the two components in
each countries' overall system. For example, over 60 percent of all
health care spending in India occurs through the private system (see
Berman 1991; Griffin 1990). Moreover, the private system charges user
fees that generally cover the full cost of medical care (although each
country's private sector has some voluntary hospitals that effectively
provide subsidized care). Such arrangements will tend to concentrate the
personal medical care costs associated with AIDS upon the individuals
living with AIDS and their families.
Second, Indonesia and Thailand (but not India) charge user fees for
public health care. Although these fees do not cover the full costs of
the health care provided, they are designed to recover a significant
portion of them. Such fees place a significant burden of medical care
costs upon AIDS patients and their families.
Of the three countries under study, AIDS medical care costs will be
spread most widely in India, given the absence of user charges by its
public health care system. However, the absence of such charges results
in relatively long lines at Indian public hospitals and clinics, thereby
increasing the cost of the epidemic by the value of the time spent seeking
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medical care. These costs are heavily concentrated upon individuals
living with AIDS and their families.
Third, all three countries have health insurance schemes that will
spread AIDS medical care costs among all their participants. However,
these schemes involve relatively small fractions of the population in each
country: 4 percent in India, 8 percent in Indonesia, and 30 percent in
Thailand (Griffin 1990). The insurance schemes in India and Thailand
provide coverage to low-income individuals, although little is known about
the extent of the coverage. All three countries have cooperatives to
provide free health care to rural populations, but membership in these
cooperatives is limited (see Roemer 1991; Griffin 1990). Most insurance
schemes in these countries are employment-based. However, these schemes
are generally funded on a capitation basis, implying that premiums do not
vary with the payout experience of individual organizations. As a result,
the insurance systems do not provide employers with an incentive to treat
employees differently who have, or are perceived to have, different HIV
status. (For a contrasting case, in which employer incentives for
differential treatment will lead AIDS costs to become concentrated on
individuals perceived to have AIDS, see Bloom and Glied 1991.)
As epidemiological evidence suggests that the HIV is
disproportionately affecting low-income groups in all three countries, and
institutions for spreading health care costs are limited, it follows that
AIDS medical care costs are likely to increase the inequality of economic
well-being in these countries and contribute to further immiseration of
the poor.
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The National and International Division of AIDS Costs
The AIDS epidemic in Asia has evoked an international aid response.
This response has focused mainly on measures to control the spread of HIV
infection, rather than on the care of individuals with AIDS. For example,
the objectives of the Indian National AIDS Control Project (which will
receive most of its funding — over US$85 million over the next five years
— from the International Development Association and the World Health
Organization (WHO)), include increasing public awareness of HIV/AIDS,
improving blood safety, expanding the AIDS surveillance system, and
controlling the spread of other sexually transmitted diseases. Similarly,
a recent WHO grant of US$630,000 for Indonesia in 1992 provides technical
assistance to support blood screening. The WHO is also providing
technical assistance to support AIDS surveillance and health education in
Indonesia.
Future research might well focus on the determinants of
international aid for HIV/AIDS. For example, does altruism underlie the
behavior of international donors? If so, why are donor agencies not
emphasizing the priorities of national governments, focusing their aid
more heavily on prevention than care? Alternatively, are international
donors mainly interested in protecting national economies from the
potentially crippling effects of AIDS to safeguard existing loans and
investments and the development of future markets for products from their
countries (or from the countries of their main principals)? Or is another
motive to protect their own economies and societies from the international
transmission of the HIV? Finally, to what extent is international aid in
this area motivated by a concern that national AIDS policies are not
sufficiently forward looking, perhaps as a consequence of election cycles
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or national budget constraints?
Discussion and Conclusions
The distribution of AIDS costs is of concern to economists because of
its implications for the inequality of economic well-being. With respect
to the AIDS epidemic in Asia, the foregoing analyses suggest that the
current distribution of costs, in conjunction with the socioeconomic
characteristics of individuals with AIDS in these countries, is likely to
promote increased inequality. In particular, AIDS costs are heavily
concentrated upon individuals with AIDS and their families who, as current
epidemiological evidence suggests, are being drawn disproportionately from
the relatively poorer segments of the Indian, Indonesian, and Thai
populations. Thus, it appears that AIDS is having a regressive economic
impact in the Asian countries under study. By contrast, AIDS costs are
spread much more widely in the United States, where private health, life,
and disability insurance are considerably more widespread, and where
taxpayers support a large system of public health care and social welfare
programs (see Bloom and Carliner, 1988).
In addition to its implications for increasing the inequality of
economic well-being, the distribution of AIDS costs may also affect
economic efficiency by altering the epidemic's future course. An economic
system that concentrates the costs of the epidemic on individuals with
AIDS and their families will increase individuals' incentives to avoid HIV
infection (as argued, for example, by Kristol 1992), but presumably those
incentives are already quite large, especially in Asia, where lost income
is the dominant portion of private AIDS costs and is borne almost entirely
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by the individuals with AIDS and their families. Moreover, most
individuals are probably not sufficiently well informed about the dangers
associated with various high-risk activities to behave in such a way as to
avoid them. Further, even if the dangers are perceived accurately, they
are associated with costs that may be incurred well into the future, and
that may be heavily discounted in individual decisionmaking, especially in
developing countries where the future may already be clouded by other
uncertainties. Thus, economic systems that concentrate AIDS costs upon
individuals with AIDS may not, as some believe, promote increased control
of the epidemic.
At the other end of the cost sharing spectrum are economic systems in
which the government pays the bills associated with AIDS and thereby
spreads the costs among taxpayers. Such systems are usually rationalized
on the grounds that they improve the distribution of economic resources in
society, that is, they improve equity. Standard economic reasoning
suggests that the share of costs the government bears should have no
effect on its incentives to pursue programs that promote economic
efficiency. Maximization of social welfare requires that governments
pursue policies that promote economic efficiency by correcting market
failures, intervening in the market in ways that control the epidemic.
For example, such intervention is desirable under any distribution of
costs if government officials are better informed than the public about
how the disease spreads, or if society has a lower discount rate than
members of high risk groups. Government intervention is also justified to
remedy negative externalities associated with the possibility that private
individuals undervalue the costs they impose upon other members of society
when they engage in high risk behavior.
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However, characterizing governments as promoters of economic
efficiency may be inappropriate. Popularly elected officials may be
reluctant to divert scarce resources to controlling an epidemic that is
currently almost invisible, and that will not be blatantly obvious for
years. In addition, the groups that are currently at highest risk of
developing the disease are often marginalized and may have little
political power (for example, intravenous drug users, commercial sex
workers, and homosexuals). Finally, governments may simply not have the
fiscal flexibility to devote resources to AIDS prevention and care.
If Asian governments behave short-sightedly for any or all of these
reasons (liquidity constraints, the distribution of political power, or
public myopia), instead of purely promoting economic efficiency, their
behavior with respect to the AIDS epidemic may be affected by their
country's health care financing system. Governments whose treasuries are
strained by the epidemic may behave differently than governments whose
treasuries do not feel the burden of AIDS costs. Indeed, it may be
efficiency enhancing to distribute costs in ways that strengthen
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a. As of April 1992.
b. As of October 1992.
c. As of September 30, 1992.
d. As of October 1991, after which this statistic was no longer reported.
e. Expected incidence as of December 31, 1992.
Sources; Reported incidence of HIV and AIDS for India: WHO (1992); estimated
incidence and projections for India: private correspondence with Dr. James Chin;
reported and estimated incidence of HIV and AIDS for Indonesia: Jakarta Post
(1992), and correspondence with Dr. George Loth; projections for Indonesia:
correspondence with Dr. George Loth; reported incidence of HIV and AIDS for
Thailand: UNDP (1992) and private correspondence with Mr. Steven Kraus; estimated
incidence and projections for Thailand: private correspondence with Mr. Steven
Kraus and Ministry of Public Health, Thailand (1992).










































Note: These figures do not take into account direct costs associated with the prevention of
HIV infection.
a. These direct cost figures are the arithmetic mean of the full cost of treatment in the
public and private sectors in India and Indonesia respectively.
Sources: Direct Costs for India: World Bank (1992) and authors' calculations based on data
from physicians at Madras Medical College (see table 4); direct costs for Indonesia: authors'
calculations (see table 4); direct costs for Thailand: Viravaidya, Obremskey, and Myers in
this volume; indirect costs are based on the following assumptions:
• on average individuals with AIDS leave the labor force at age 35 in all three countries
• the social discount rate is 3 percent
• individuals retire from the work force at age 60
• average annual earnings equal GDP/adult (US$ 580 in India, US$ 843 in Indonesia and US$
1,971 in Thailand (World Bank 1991)).
Table 3. The Cost of Drug Therapies to Treat Opportunistic

































fever 52 (1 month) Tylenol 5.00
Chronic














Source; correspondence with Dr. George Loth. The expected pattern of
opportunistic infections is based upon the actual experience of a particular
sample of individuals in Thailand.
Table 4. Components of the Cost of Diagnosing and Treating HIV Infection


















































































































































- = not available
a. Based on private cost of treatment and our assumption that the full cost of
hospitalization and treatment in the public sector is less than in the private
sector.
b. We have assumed that these figures (from World Bank (1992) and from
correspondence with Chandna Salgaocar and Sanjay Chaudhry) do not include
drug costs.
c. The drugs administered provide treatment for symptoms of AIDS and do not
include drugs that treat the actual HIV infection.
d. Expected drug costs based on table 3.
Sources; India: Madras Medical College data; National AIDS Control Programme,
India; World Bank (1992); correspondence with Chandana Salgaocar and Sanjay
Chaudhry.
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